Supreme Court Upholds ECI’s Power To Conduct Special Intensive Revision Of Bihar Electoral Rolls, Says Article 324 And RP Act Are Not Competing Powers

The Supreme Court has upheld the Election Commission of India’s power to conduct a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across an entire State, rejecting a batch of writ petitions that had challenged the SIR exercise undertaken in Bihar in 2025 as unconstitutional, disproportionate and violative of statutory safeguards.

A Bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi held that the Election Commission’s authority under Article 324 of the Constitution and Parliament’s legislative competence under Article 327 are “complementary, not competing” domains, and that Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 independently empowers the Commission to direct a special revision covering “many” or “all” constituencies in a State where state wide reasons, such as rapid urbanisation, migration and duplication of entries, justify it.

Background

The SIR was ordered by the Election Commission through an order dated 24.06.2025, directing a house to house verification of electoral rolls in every Assembly constituency of Bihar. The Commission noted that the last intensive revision in the State had been carried out in 2003, and that over two decades of only summary revisions had allowed inaccuracies, including duplicate entries, deceased voters, and migrated electors, to accumulate.

Under the order, the 2003 electoral roll was treated as presumptive evidence of eligibility, and anyone not appearing on it was required to submit one of eleven prescribed documents, along with an Enumeration Form, by 25.07.2025, failing which their name would not appear in the draft roll.

A batch of writ petitions was filed under Article 32 challenging the order. Some petitioners, notably in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 855 of 2025, supported the exercise, urging that such revisions ought to be conducted periodically to weed out ineligible entries caused by illegal migration.

The timeline of the exercise, as recorded by the Court, shows that on the expiry of the deadline for Enumeration Forms, the Commission found that 7 lakh electors were enrolled at multiple places, 22 lakh were recorded as deceased, and 36 lakh had permanently shifted or were not traceable. The draft roll published on 01.08.2025 contained about 7.24 crore electors, down from roughly 7.89 crore before the SIR began, meaning nearly 65 lakh electors initially stood excluded for non submission of forms.

During the pendency of the petitions, the Court passed several interim orders, directing publication of the list of about 65 lakh excluded electors with reasons (14.08.2025), impleading twelve political parties to assist voters through Booth Level Agents (22.08.2025), and directing that Aadhaar be treated as a 12th valid document of identity, though not as proof of citizenship (08.09.2025). By the time the final roll was published on 30.09.2025, it contained 7.42 crore electors. The Bihar Assembly elections were subsequently held in November 2025 on the basis of this roll, with results declared on 14.11.2025.

Petitioners’ Contentions

Appearing for the petitioners, senior counsel including Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Vrinda Grover and several others, along with Mr. Yogendra Yadav who argued in person, mounted a wide ranging challenge to the Impugned Order. Their central argument was that the Commission’s reliance on Article 324 of the Constitution as the source of its power was fundamentally misconceived, since the article is not a freestanding reservoir of authority that can be invoked outside the legislative framework. According to the petitioners, the settled position, as expounded in decisions such as Mohinder Singh Gill versus Chief Election Commissioner and A.C. Jose versus Sivan Pillai, is that the residuary power traceable to Article 324 operates only in the interstitial spaces left unoccupied by Parliament, and once Parliament has legislated on electoral rolls through the Representation of the People Act and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, the Commission cannot leapfrog that framework by invoking its plenary constitutional power.

Even assuming Section 21(3) of the RP Act could be treated as an independent source of authority, the petitioners argued that its language did not stretch far enough to justify what the Commission had done. Section 21(3), on a plain reading, empowers a special revision only of any constituency or part of a constituency, a formulation they described as inherently constituency specific, incapable of being read to authorise a sweeping, state wide exercise covering every Assembly seat in Bihar at once. They submitted that the provision was conceived as an extraordinary and narrowly targeted tool for exceptional, localised circumstances, and that stretching it into an instrument for wholesale revision would amount to reading into the statute a power Parliament had deliberately withheld.

The petitioners further argued that even if the Commission possessed the power to order the SIR, the manner of its exercise was arbitrary and disproportionate. They submitted that the Impugned Order disclosed no cogent or specific reasons capable of justifying an exercise of this magnitude, and that by calling upon lakhs of already enrolled electors to re establish their credentials through an entirely new and onerous process, the Commission had effectively inverted the settled presumption attaching to an existing entry in the electoral roll. Relying on the decisions in Lal Babu Hussein versus Electoral Registration Officer and Inderjit Barua versus Election Commission of India, they argued that electors already on the rolls are entitled to a presumption of citizenship and eligibility that cannot lightly be displaced, and that treating the 2003 roll as the benchmark for this exercise was an arbitrary classification with no rational basis, since nothing on record showed that the 2003 roll possessed any special degree of accuracy that subsequent rolls lacked.

On procedure, it was contended that existing voters could be deleted from the rolls merely for failing to submit the enumeration form, without the notice and hearing that Rule 21A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 requires before any name is removed, and that Booth Level Officers had been given largely unchecked discretion in the verification process without adequate safeguards against error or abuse. Finally, the petitioners argued that the exercise, in substance, amounted to a citizenship screening drive dressed up as an electoral roll revision, a function that fell squarely within the domain of the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, and one the Commission had neither the constitutional mandate nor the institutional competence to perform.

ECI’s Contentions

Opposing the challenge, senior counsel appearing for the Election Commission, including Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Maninder Singh, Mr. D.S. Naidu, Mr. Vijay Hansaria and Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, along with Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta, defended the Impugned Order as squarely within the Commission’s constitutional mandate. They argued that Article 324 vests in the Commission a wide and continuing power of superintendence, direction and control over the preparation of electoral rolls, and that while Article 327 allows Parliament to legislate on elections, that power operates subject to the Constitution and does not reduce the Commission to a subordinate delegate, a proposition traced to the decision in Sadiq Ali versus Election Commission of India. Relying on All Party Hill Leaders Conference versus Captain W.A. Sangma and Kanhiya Lal Omar versus R.K. Trivedi, they submitted that the Commission has repeatedly been recognised as possessing the jurisdiction to issue directions of a general, even quasi legislative, character wherever necessary to secure free and fair elections, and that Mohinder Singh Gill does not strip the Commission of authority the moment Parliament legislates, so long as it does not act in defiance of an express statutory command.

On the scope of Section 21(3), the Commission argued that the phrase in such manner as it may think fit, coupled with the opening non obstante clause overriding Section 21(2), was deliberately drafted in wide and enabling terms, freeing the Commission from the ordinary procedural limitations that would otherwise apply and vesting it with the discretion to design a revision process suited to the exigencies before it. As for the word any preceding constituency, the Commission contended there was nothing in the text confining a special revision to a single constituency or a small cluster, particularly where the reasons cited, rapid urbanisation, duplication of entries, and large scale intra state and inter state migration, were common to every constituency in the State, making a constituency by constituency approach both impractical and unnecessary. It was also stressed that the necessity of an SIR was not seriously in dispute, since political parties across the spectrum had long raised concerns about the accuracy of rolls built up only through successive summary revisions, and that the challenge before the Court was, in substance, confined to questions of method rather than the need for revision itself.

On documentation, the Commission maintained that the eleven document framework it had prescribed was in fact more generous than the framework used during the 2003 revision, and that the exclusion of specific documents, namely the Aadhaar card, the Ration card and the Electors Photo Identity Card, from that list rested on rational considerations: the Aadhaar Act itself does not treat the Aadhaar card as proof of citizenship or domicile, Ration cards had in its experience proved susceptible to large scale irregularity and forgery, and the EPIC, being itself issued on the strength of an existing roll entry, could not logically be used to verify the correctness of that very entry. Finally, on the citizenship question, the Commission argued that its power to examine the citizenship of a person claiming enrolment flows directly from Articles 325 and 326 read with Section 16 of the RP Act, that Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 addresses only the narrow question of termination of citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality and does not oust other authorities from examining citizenship for their own statutory purposes, and that what the Commission undertakes is, in any event, not a conclusive determination of citizenship but a limited enquiry into eligibility for enrolment.

ECI’s Power To Order A State Wide SIR

The Court held that Articles 324 and 327 are not competing repositories of power but operate through mutual accommodation, and not mutual destruction. Tracing the evolution of Section 21 of the RP Act from the original Section 25, the Bench held that Section 21(3), introduced by the 1956 amendment, was a deliberate legislative device conferring an independent and enabling power on the Commission to conduct a special revision at any time, in such manner as it may think fit, subject only to recording reasons. Interpreting the word “any” in the phrase “any constituency or part of a constituency,” the Court held it could, depending on context, mean “many” or “all,” and that reading it restrictively as “only” would render the special revision power nugatory in cases of state wide problems. The Court accordingly held that a state wide SIR, based on state wide causes, is squarely within the Commission’s statutory authority under Section 21(3), and that the absence of a rule framed under Section 28 governing this specific power was no bar, since the Commission’s plenary authority flows directly from the Constitution itself.

Distinguishing A.C. Jose, the Court held that case had involved a direct conflict between an ECI notification and an express statutory scheme contemplating paper ballots, a critical element completely missing in the present dispute, since Section 21(3) itself expressly authorises departure from the ordinary revision procedure.

Proportionality Test

Turning to proportionality, the Court applied the four pronged framework drawn from its own precedents, including the majority opinion in Vivek Narayan Sharma versus Union of India, the demonetisation case, examining in turn whether the exercise served a legitimate purpose, whether the means chosen bore a rational connection to that purpose, whether a less restrictive alternative was available, and whether the measure struck a fair balance between the public objective and the burden placed on the individual voter.

On legitimate purpose, the Court held that the twin objectives underlying the Impugned Order, ensuring the inclusion of every eligible elector and the exclusion of every ineligible one, are not merely administrative goals but are embedded in Articles 325 and 326 of the Constitution themselves, and that the factors the Commission had cited, the non reporting of deaths, large scale migration, and duplication of entries, correspond precisely to the grounds for deletion already recognised under Rule 21A of the 1960 Rules, so that the Commission was, if anything, discharging an obligation the statutory scheme itself contemplates. On rational nexus, the Court found that a structured house to house enumeration exercise, backed by standardised forms and prescribed documentation, was intrinsically well suited to uncovering precisely the kind of outdated and inaccurate entries the Commission had identified, particularly since the process was embedded within a broader framework of scrutiny, notice and appeal that guarded against arbitrary outcomes.

On whether a less intrusive alternative existed, the Court was unwilling to substitute its own view of the ideal methodology for that of the Commission, holding that this determination fell within the specialised institutional competence of a body uniquely positioned to judge the scale, feasibility and administrative practicality of an electoral revision, much as the Court had deferred to the executive’s assessment of complex policy considerations in Vivek Narayan Sharma. It reasoned that where the underlying problem is structural and pervasive, spanning the whole of the electoral roll rather than isolated pockets of irregularity, a comprehensive state wide exercise cannot be branded excessive merely because a narrower, constituency specific alternative was theoretically conceivable. Finally, weighing the importance of an accurate and credible electoral roll against the burden imposed on the individual voter, whose right to vote, though a valued constitutional right recognised in Rajbala versus State of Haryana, is not absolute or unconditioned, the Court held that the documentation requirements, the multiple channels for submitting forms, and the procedural safeguards of notice, hearing and appeal, taken together, meant the exercise did not cross the line into a disproportionate restriction. The Court was also candid in crediting its own successive interim interventions, directing publication of the list of excluded electors with reasons, admitting Aadhaar as a further document of identity, and mobilising Booth Level Agents of political parties and para legal volunteers of the Legal Services Authorities, with having progressively supplied the safeguards that kept the exercise within constitutional bounds.

The Presumption Attached To Existing Entries

The Court clarified that while an entry in the electoral roll does carry a rebuttable presumption of regularity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, this is an evidentiary presumption and not a conclusive legal fiction. It held that Lal Babu Hussein was rendered in the context of adjudicatory proceedings triggered by individual objections, and did not address, much less bar, a systemic, inquisitorial re verification exercise undertaken by the Commission in discharge of its constitutional mandate. A prior entry, the Court held, cannot be used as a shield to obstruct such oversight, though the presumption continues to inform the procedural fairness required in the process.

Compliance With Rule 21A

Rejecting the argument that the SIR bypassed the notice and hearing safeguards of Rule 21A, the Court held that the SIR Guidelines distribute the elements of Rule 21A (identification of doubtful entries, notice, and a reasoned decision) across the multiple stages of the exercise, namely enumeration, draft publication, and the claims and objections process, rather than eliminating them. Non inclusion in the draft roll, the Court emphasised, is only a provisional step and not a final deletion. The substantive safeguards of a show cause notice, enquiry, and speaking order by the ERO are triggered at the claims and objections stage, followed by a two tier statutory appeal to the District Magistrate and then the Chief Electoral Officer.

The Documentation Regime

The Court upheld the exclusion of the Ration Card and EPIC from the list of acceptable documents, while Aadhaar had already been directed to be included as a 12th document by the Court’s earlier order of 08.09.2025. It reasoned that the EPIC is a derivative document issued on the very basis of inclusion in the electoral roll, so allowing it as proof would make the verification exercise circular and self defeating, while the Ration Card’s evidentiary reliability had been undermined by instances of large scale irregularities. The Commission, it held, was entitled to differentiate between documents based on their evidentiary value rather than being compelled to adopt a lowest common denominator approach.

The ECI’s Power To Examine Citizenship

This is among the most significant findings in the judgment. The Court held that the Commission is empowered to conduct a limited, prima facie enquiry into citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself of eligibility under Section 16 of the RP Act, but drew a sharp distinction between this administrative satisfaction and a formal adjudication of citizenship status under the Citizenship Act, 1955, which remains within the exclusive domain of the Competent Authority under that Act. The Court held that Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, dealing only with termination of citizenship on voluntary acquisition of foreign nationality, does not oust other constitutional or statutory authorities from examining citizenship incidental to their own functions.

Crucially, the Court directed that in cases of doubt, the Commission must refer the individual to the Competent Authority for final adjudication, and any deletion on citizenship grounds remains subject to the outcome of that adjudication, which must be decided within a reasonable time, preferably before the next Parliamentary, Assembly, or Local Body election in that State.

Conclusion And Directions

Bringing the various strands of its reasoning together, the Court disposed of the writ petitions by upholding the Impugned SIR in its entirety. It held that the exercise does not conflict with the Representation of the People Act or the 1960 Rules and is properly traceable to Section 21(3) of the Act read with Article 324 of the Constitution, and that, as conducted, it satisfies the constitutional standard of proportionality, having been founded on a legitimate and constitutionally grounded purpose and accompanied by sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrary exclusion. The Court further held that while inclusion in the electoral roll does give rise to a presumption of validity, that presumption is rebuttable and cannot be used to place a blanket embargo on the Commission’s power to undertake a Special Intensive Revision, and that the decision in Lal Babu Hussein, being confined to adjudicatory proceedings arising from individual objections, does not compel a different conclusion. It also held that the deletions carried out under the exercise were not contrary to Rule 21A, since the safeguards of notice and hearing that the Rule contemplates were preserved in substance, if redistributed, across the different stages of the SIR process, and that the documentation framework prescribed by the Commission, with Aadhaar now included as a twelfth document of identity pursuant to the Court’s own earlier order, was not arbitrary or without rational basis. Finally, the Court held that the Commission is empowered to conduct a limited enquiry into citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself as to eligibility for enrolment, though such an enquiry does not amount to, and cannot be treated as, a conclusive determination of citizenship under the Citizenship Act.

On the specific question of individuals whose names had been deleted from the 2003 roll on the ground that the Commission was of the opinion they were not citizens, the Court directed that all such cases be referred, within four weeks, to the Competent Authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955 for adjudication. That authority was directed to take a final decision in accordance with law, after giving the affected individuals notice and an opportunity of hearing, preferably before the next Parliamentary, Assembly or Local Body election in the State, whichever is earlier, so that no one is left in a state of prolonged uncertainty about their status. Should the Competent Authority ultimately hold that a deleted individual is in fact a citizen, that person is to be included in the electoral roll. The Court additionally granted liberty to any person domiciled in Bihar whose name had been erroneously deleted on the ground of being absent, dead, shifted, or caught in a duplication, to challenge the Commission’s decision by way of judicial review. With these directions, the writ petitions, along with all pending interlocutory applications, stood disposed of.

Appearances For Petitioners: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Vrinda Grover, Mr. Shoeb Alam, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, and a large team of senior and other counsel.

For Respondent Election Commission of India: Solicitor General Mr. Tushar Mehta, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr. Maninder Singh, Mr. D.S. Naidu, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, and others.